

#51-70

23 DEC 1970

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

**Confidential**



# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

STATSPEC




**Confidential**

23 DECEMBER 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 51)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

## WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

## C O N T E N T S

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . i

## INDOCHINA

DRV Anniversaries Are Peg for Attacks on Nixon "Schemes" . . . . . 1  
 DRV Foreign Ministry, NHAN DAN Score U.S. on Prisoner Issue . . . . . 4  
 Paris Talks: Stress on U.S. "War Acts," PRG Cease-Fire Stand . . . . . 6  
 USSR Government Statement Belatedly Supports DRV Appeal . . . . . 7  
 Vietnamese Communist Media Hail Ten Years of NFLSV "Victories" . . . . . 8  
 Peking Gives NFLSV Anniversary High-Level Attention . . . . . 10  
 Moscow Observes NFLSV Anniversary in Standard Fashion . . . . . 11  
 Cambodian Front Denounces "False" FUNK Radio Appeal . . . . . 12  
 Sino-Cambodian Friendship Anniversaries Marked in Peking . . . . . 13

## POLAND

Gierek Promises Conciliation, Calls for Law and Order . . . . . 14  
 Moscow Reacts Cautiously to Polish Developments . . . . . 17  
 East European Allies Circumspect, Assail RFE and VOA . . . . . 18  
 Tirana Airs Statement of Purported Dissident Polish CP . . . . . 20  
 Peking Sees Crisis in Soviet "Colonial Rule" in East Europe . . . . . 21  
 Belgrade Sees Chance for "Socialist Democracy" under Gierek . . . . . 23  
 Italian, Spanish CP's Put Blame on Lack of Socialist Democracy . . . . . 24

## BERLIN

GDR, USSR Deny Responsibility for SPD Meeting "Consequences" . . . . . 28

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Border River Navigation Talks Conclude with Protocol . . . . . 30  
 Ideological Dispute Persists in Polemical Comment . . . . . 30

## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Kwangtung Claims Success in Rebuilding Party at Lower Level . . . . . 33

## MIDDLE EAST

CPSU-ASU Communique Supports Peace Efforts, Timetable Proposal . . . . . 34  
 'Ali Sabri Delegation Hears Kosygin Call for Withdrawal . . . . . 36  
 USSR Complains of Israeli Procrastination on Jarring Talks . . . . . 38

## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

USSR Gives Minimal Attention to Wind-up of Helsinki Talks . . . . . 40

TOPIC IN BRIEF: Vented U.S. Nuclear Test

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 20 DECEMBER 1970

<u>Moscow (3755 items)</u>			<u>Peking (3020 items)</u>		
Indochina	(5%)	19%	Indochina	(30%)	60%
[NFLSV Anniversary	(--)	8%]	[DRV Appeal on	(22%)	39%]
[DRV Appeal on	(1%)	8%]	U.S. "War Acts"		
U.S. "War Acts"			[NFLSV Anniversary	(--)	12%]
Supreme Soviet	(20%)	6%	[Anniversary of	(--)	7%]
Session			PRC-Cambodian		
Luna 17 and	(3%)	5%	Treaty		
Lunakhod			Domestic Issues	(30%)	24%
RSFSR Supreme	(--)	4%	Mali Government	(--)	2%
Soviet Session			Delegation in PRC		
China	(4%)	1%	Invasion of Guinea	(5%)	2%
Angela Davis Case	(2%)	4%	Unrest in Spain	(--)	1%
Basque Case	(2%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

Hanoi propaganda in the wake of the 10 December joint party-government appeal and the President's press conference that day continues to stress that the DRV will not be deterred from supporting the South by U.S. "threats" or such "acts of war" as the November air strikes. A "grand meeting" on the 22d marking the anniversaries of Resistance Day and the VPA provided the platform for both Defense Minister Giap and Premier Pham Van Dong to condemn the Nixon Administration's "serious acts of war" against the DRV and continued "aggression" throughout Indochina.

Moscow's official endorsement of the DRV appeal came belatedly on the 16th in a government statement which calls the appeal an "important step" in the mobilization of Vietnamese patriots. Only after the release of the Soviet Government statement did Moscow report the 13 December PRC Party-Government statement on the appeal.

Hanoi's attack on the Nixon Administration includes denunciation of the "noisy propaganda campaign" about the "so-called" prisoner-of-war question. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and a lengthy NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 23d again reject the idea of releasing prisoners before there is agreement on such "basic" issues as a U.S. troop withdrawal. The foreign ministry spokesman merely referred ambiguously to Hanoi's supplying a list of prisoners to "a number of goodwilled personalities"; it was not until some nine hours after VNA carried the statement that it reported the 22 December press conference by the DRV delegate general in Paris regarding the list of U.S. prisoners supplied to representatives of Senators Kennedy and Fulbright.

Voluminous attention to the 10th anniversary of the founding of the NFLSV (20 December) includes reports of the usual meetings in a "liberated zone" and in Hanoi, attended by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and First Secretary Le Duan respectively. A lengthy article attributed to PRG Defense Minister and PLAF Commander Tran Nam Trung--the text of which is not yet available in translation--is unique in its unusual attention to the role of "big units" in the war. It implies that action by large communist units has continued to play a major role and maintains that the "stepping up" of their actions is necessary.

## DRV ANNIVERSARIES ARE PEG FOR ATTACKS ON NIXON "SCHEMES"

HANOI Hanoi media reported on the 22d that the usual meeting was held the evening before to mark the 26th

anniversary of the Vietnam People's Army (22 December) and the 24th anniversary of National Resistance Day (19 December). The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 2 -

opening speech was delivered by Premier Pham Van Dong and the main address by Vo Nguyen Giap, as was the case last year. Other North Vietnamese leaders reported as present included Col. Gen. Van Tien Dung, Hoang Quoc Viet, and Lt. Gen. Song Hao. Truong Chinh was absent from the VPA anniversary celebration for the first time in at least 10 years.\*

In his opening remarks, Dong said the anniversaries were being observed at a time when the United States is "heavily defeated" but is "carrying out extremely dangerous schemes and acts of war against the DRV." On this occasion, he said, "all the Vietnamese people express their steel-like determination to respond" to the 10 December party-government appeal. In his speech, as reviewed by VNA and Hanoi radio,\*\* Giap asserted that the celebrations were being held "in a seething revolutionary atmosphere prevalent throughout the country" and that all the armed forces and people are responding to the joint appeal.

Giap echoed propaganda since the 21 November U.S. bombing raids against the DRV, although there is no specific reference to them or to the POW rescue mission in the available summaries of his speech. He reportedly condemned the United States for "repeatedly carrying out extremely serious war acts against the DRV and for uttering piratical arguments threatening it with war."

Judging from the accounts, Giap made no direct mention of the President's 10 December press conference. But according to VNA he scored the Administration for "nakedly fabricating the myth of 'tacit agreement'" and giving itself the right to strike when U.S. reconnaissance planes are fired at, when U.S. planes are spotted by radar, when DRV troops are concentrated, when the lives of U.S. troops in South Vietnam are threatened; and,

---

\* The last public function attended by Truong Chinh was the 19-22 October session of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee. Prior to that, his activities had been reported fairly frequently; he had appeared on more than 10 occasions since the beginning of September.

\*\* Hanoi radio also broadcast Giap's speech in full, but poor reception precluded texting.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 3 -

"failing arguments, when they feel it 'necessary.'" Giap reiterated the DRV's right "to track and shoot down all U.S. planes, regardless of type" if they violate DRV airspace, the right "to concentrate troops in whatever zone" to protect the fatherland, and the right and determination "to annihilate any enemy who intrudes into our country."

Like the party-government appeal, Giap disputed the "illusion" harbored by the United States that it can prevent the people of the North from supporting their southern compatriots. Claiming that the Vietnamese people, "millions as one," have responded to the appeal, he termed it "the appeal of the fatherland and the will of all the people." He claimed that it has "encouraged" the entire armed forces and people to persevere and step up the fight. Adding that it has been "firmly and widely supported" by the socialist countries and "friends" throughout the world, he routinely thanked them "for their wholehearted support and great aid." He called on "compatriots and fighters throughout the country to launch a vigorous revolutionary-action movement" in response to the appeal and on all the members of the armed forces to "seriously implement" the VPA High Command's order.

Editorial comment on the VPA anniversary is not yet available in translation, but the 19 December NHAN DAN editorial on the Resistance Day anniversary routinely reviews the resistance struggle and echoes the party-government appeal's assertion that "frenzied acts" do not prove U.S. strength. It reaffirms that the Vietnamese "are resolved not to fear any threat of violence."

PEKING Peking's attention to the VPA anniversary generally follows the pattern of last year. Lin Piao sent the usual message to DRV Defense Minister Giap and the PRC Defense Ministry held a meeting on the 22d attended by Vietnamese diplomatic personnel and Chinese military figures, including Director of the PLA General Political Department Li Teh-sheng, who was the main Chinese speaker, and Deputy Chief of Staff Yen Chung-chuan. A reception at the DRV Embassy on the same day was attended by Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, among others, and addressed by the DRV military attache and Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Fa-hsien.

MOSCOW Soviet Defense Minister Grechko sent the usual greetings message to Giap on the occasion of the VPA anniversary pointing to Soviet measures to render the Vietnamese "comprehensive aid." Other publicity for the anniversary includes the customary press articles and a brief TASS report on the Hanoi meeting.



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 4 -

## DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY, NHAN DAN SCORE U.S. ON PRISONER ISSUE

Hanoi media first mentioned the matter of the list of U.S. war prisoners detained in the North when VNA's English transmission at 0610 GMT on 23 December carried the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement.\* Basically a reiteration of the long-standing Hanoi position on prisoners, the statement merely says that "the competent services" of the DRV Government "on request handed the list of all U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam to a number of goodwilled personalities" in the United States and other countries.

A few hours before the release of the foreign ministry spokesman's statement, Hanoi radio broadcast a lengthy NHAN DAN Commentator article "analyzing" the prisoner issue and scoring the Administration's "propaganda campaign" about it. Commentator said nothing about Hanoi's having supplied a list of the men held captive; however, it listed U.S. moves in the "propaganda campaign," saying the United States sent letters and petitions, had the prisoners' wives "go to one place after another," and sent "millionaire Perot and Astronaut Borman to campaign in various countries."

Hanoi media apparently did not mention DRV delegate general Mai Van Bo's 22 December press conference regarding the turning over of the list of prisoners until 1715 GMT on the 23d, when VNA English carried an account. VNA noted that Bo had received representatives of Senators Kennedy and Fulbright and Mrs. Cora Weiss, that the Senators' representatives were given the list of prisoners and handed letters from DRV President Ton Duc Thang and Premier Pham Van Dong, and that Mrs. Weiss' representative was handed letters for Senator McGovern from Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, as well as one for Mrs. Weiss from the Vietnam Solidarity Committee.

---

\* This is the third time a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the POW issue has been released during the Nixon Administration. A spokesman's statement on 6 September 1969 scored Defense Secretary Laird for "making slanderous accusations" against the DRV with regard to prisoners, and a 21 May 1969 spokesman's statement took Laird to task for criticizing DRV policy toward U.S. prisoners on 19 May.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 5 -

Both the NHAN DAN Commentator article and the foreign ministry spokesman's statement point out that the PRG's eight-point elaboration of 17 September provides for immediate discussion of the release of prisoners if the United States will state its agreement to withdraw troops from South Vietnam by 30 June 1971. The NHAN DAN Commentator scores the President's "exchange of prisoners" proposal in his 7 October peace proposal and argues that the matter of releasing "aggressor" pilots cannot be separated from a settlement of the U.S. "aggressive war." Commentator charges that the fact that the U.S. delegate at the Paris talks urged that the POW problem be discussed separately and that a procedure concerning the exchange of prisoners be discussed immediately shows U.S. unwillingness to discuss the basic problems.

Both the statement and NHAN DAN repeat Hanoi's consistent claim that the prisoners are treated "humanely" under DRV law, and Commentator says President Nixon "lied" at his 10 December press conference when he said that regarding the POW issue, North Vietnam was an international outlaw. (A 12 December Commentator article in NHAN DAN had also noted this remark by the President.) Both items also mention that in signing the 1949 Geneva Convention the DRV made "an explicit reservation about Article 85." The spokesman's statement recalls the reservation: "The DRV declares that the prisoners of war prosecuted and condemned for war crimes or crimes against humanity, in accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, shall not benefit by the provisos of the Geneva convention as stipulated by Article 85." Hanoi argues routinely, however, that the DRV has "unservingly pursued a lenient and humane policy" toward the prisoners.

PRG STATEMENT ON GVN  
RELEASE OF PRISONERS

It was the PRG, not the DRV Government, which reacted promptly to the 22 December announcement by GVN Foreign Minister Lam that that the GVN would release 50 disabled North Vietnamese prisoners as a humanitarian gesture for Tet.\* Liberation Radio

---

\* The GVN's announcement at the 11 June Paris session that it would release a group of North Vietnamese wounded prisoners and captured fishermen on 11 July was belatedly acknowledged by Hanoi in a 23 June VNA "authorized" statement. See the TRENDS of 17 June 1970, page 5, and 24 June 1970, page 5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 6 -

reported on 23 December that the PRG's Interior Ministry spokesman issued a statement regarding the GVN's "ballyhoo that it will release a number of persons whom it calls North Vietnamese prisoners of war." The spokesman called this a "familiar trick" in the framework of the allies' "deceitful campaign" demanding humane treatment of prisoners and "slanderingly accusing" the North of waging aggression against the South.

#### PARIS TALKS: STRESS ON U.S. "WAR ACTS," PRG CEASE-FIRE STAND

In standard fashion, the VNA account of the 95th session of the Paris talks on 17 December ignores the substance of the allied delegates' statements in which they repeated the proposals regarding the treatment of POW's and for an early exchange of all prisoners. Mme. Binh in her statement briefly scored the President's 10 December press conference; DRV delegate Xuan Thuy commented at length, although the VNA account obscures many of the details. VNA does note Thuy's generalization that the President's remarks "constitute a new U.S. escalation of threats of violence against the DRV," as well as his attack on the President's "fallacious allegations" regarding a so-called "understanding" at the time of the 1968 bombing halt.

Both the VNA and LPA accounts reflect Mme. Binh's repetition of her remarks on a cease-fire the previous week--to the effect that a cease-fire would exist with the United States and the Saigon regime, respectively, when there is agreement on U.S. withdrawal by 30 June 1971 and on the formation of a provisional coalition government by the PRG and a Saigon administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem. VNA notes her charge that the Nixon Administration has "so far avoided the PRG's logical and reasonable proposals" and "has no desire to engage into a negotiated settlement" on Vietnam. She scored the President's standstill cease-fire proposal of 7 October as "simply aiming at legalizing U.S. aggression."

VNA briefly notes that Xuan Thuy, in concluding his speech, "demanded that the U.S. chief delegate answer seriously questions on the cease-fire raised by the PRG delegation in the previous session."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 7 -

### USSR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT BELATEDLY SUPPORTS DRV APPEAL

Moscow belatedly supports the 10 December DRV Party-Government appeal with a USSR Government statement on the 16th. The six-day delay in releasing the statement contrasts with past practice in which USSR Government statements on Indochina have normally followed DRV statements by no more than two days. For example, the most recent previous high-level Soviet statement, the one read by Kosygin on 4 May--condemning the 30 April U.S. incursion into Cambodia and the 1-2 May air strikes against the DRV--followed a 2 May DRV Government statement. It is possible that there was uncertainty or disagreement in Moscow on the official response this time and that a factor in the decision may have been the PRC joint party-government statement of the 13th. TASS in English and Russian reported the Chinese statement on the 17th--after the USSR statement--and the report was published in PRAVDA on the 18th.

Moscow's initial reluctance to express high-level support for the DRV appeal seemed evident in differing TASS and VNA accounts of Kosygin's meeting with the DRV ambassador. VNA, but not TASS, reported that when the ambassador handed Kosygin a copy of the appeal on the 14th the Soviet Premier expressed "full support" of the document.

The Soviet statement calls the DRV appeal an "important step" in the mobilization of Vietnamese patriots but--unlike the PRC statement--does not explicitly express "support" for it. Moscow's statement does repeat the more generalized promise of continued aid and support for the Vietnamese people's struggle and support for the DRV position on a settlement. It recalls that the "U.S. aggression" was condemned by the members of the Warsaw Pact, and it concludes by warning vaguely that the USSR will "draw appropriate conclusions" from the new U.S. "provocations."

The Soviet statement condemns the U.S. "barbaric raids" on the DRV and the statement by President Nixon which, it says, contains "direct threats" to resume bombing. It reiterates the charge that the United States ignored its own commitments on ending the bombing, as well as its "widely publicized statements about a striving to achieve an honorable political settlement." Further, the statement explicitly criticizes U.S. behavior at the Paris talks as indicating no intention to end the war and reach an agreement that would accommodate the rights and aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Accusing the United States of wanting to

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 8 -

continue the war under the guise of Vietnamization, it again demands a troop withdrawal and agreement to the formation of a provisional coalition government, but it makes no specific mention of the NFLSV-PRG peace plan.

### VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MEDIA HAIL TEN YEARS OF NFLSV "VICTORIES"

Beginning in the first week of December, Hanoi and Front media publicize comment marking the 10th anniversary of the founding of the NFLSV, including reviews of the history of the war during the past 10 years which acclaim past "victories" and reaffirm that the 1968 Tet offensive opened a new phase in the war.

**FRONT MEETING** The annual anniversary meeting in a "liberated zone" was attended this year by NFLSV President Nguyen Huu Tho, PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, and Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao. Tho delivered the major address to the gathering. (Last year Phat was the ranking leader at the meeting and delivered the main speech.) As would be expected, Tho claimed that the South Vietnamese struggle has achieved "tremendous victories," and he reiterated the correctness of the NFLSV-PRG position as set forth in the 10-point solution and eight-point elaboration. In addition, Tho quoted the statement on the prerequisites for a cease-fire which PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh had spelled out at the Paris session on the 10th.

Tho reaffirmed the NFLSV's commitment to "unity and national concord" among the South Vietnamese people and its willingness to work together with different elements in South Vietnam, including members of the Saigon administration, who support peace, independence, democracy, and neutrality. Tho predicted that political dissension in South Vietnamese towns would "grow ever more serious" and claimed that the anti-administration political movement in the cities, along with the PLAF's "military offensive" and "uprisings of the rural people," had "inflicted a serious failure" on the Vietnamization program.

Trinh Dinh Thao, in a speech to the meeting, also lauded the struggle in South Vietnamese cities and termed national unity the main basis for the victory of the revolution.

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 9 -

OBSERVANCE  
IN HANOI

Hanoi marked the NFLSV's 10th anniversary with a meeting, editorial comment, and a message from Ton Duc Thang. Thang's message, like last year's, is addressed only to Nguyen Huu Tho, although some foreign messages this year were jointly addressed to Tho and to Huynh Tan Phat. In addition to routinely lauding the Front, the message accuses the United States of remaining "very bellicose and perfidious" and continuing to "block the Paris conference" and to "plot new military adventures against the DRV." It states that in response to the DRV Party-Government appeal, the North Vietnamese people are determined to carry on the struggle, are increasing vigilance and production, and are resolved to punish the "U.S. aggressors" and fulfill the North's obligation to the South.

Following opening remarks by Ton Duc Thang at the 18 December meeting, Hoang Quoc Viet delivered a speech in which he praised the NFLSV's "correct and clever leadership" and hailed the Front as the "organizer and promoter of all successes of the South Vietnamese people." The meeting also heard an address by Nguyen Phu Soai, acting head of the PRG representation in Hanoi. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap attended the gathering.

A 20 December NHAN DAN editorial hails the NFLSV's leadership and, claiming sustained progress in the war, asserts that since the 1968 Tet offensive the trend in South Vietnam has been "the continuous strengthening of our victorious posture, while the enemy's losing posture has become clearer and clearer and the balance on the battlefield has tipped in our favor." The editorial maintains that "the whole scheme of 'Vietnamization'" has been checked and that the United States is "facing a very difficult situation." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the same date similarly describes the United States as "bitterly defeated" but warns that the Nixon Administration is stepping up Vietnamization, trying to uproot "revolutionary organizations," and "striking logistic and supply sources" and seeking to "drive the liberation armed forces far from the populated areas."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 10 -

## PEKING GIVES NFLSV ANNIVERSARY HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION

The 10th anniversary of the NFLSV draws greater attention in Peking than the event has occasioned in recent years. For the first time since 1967 there is a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a Front delegation is in Peking for the celebration, and, unlike last year, a Peking rally was held, attended by Chou En-lai for the first time since 1967. The NFLSV delegation, led by Presidium member Dang Tran Thi, arrived in Peking on the 18th, and on the 19th met with Chou En-lai and other PRC leaders and was welcomed at a banquet given by Chou. On the 21st the delegation was present at a PRC Defense Ministry meeting attended by Deputy Chief of Staff Chiu Hui-tso.

The NFLSV anniversary message--addressed by Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat--is typical of other comment in claiming that the Front is leading a successful fight which inspires others throughout the world and will succeed through protracted people's war. It routinely reaffirms that it is China's "bounden proletarian internationalist duty" to "render support and assistance to the people of Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina." And it concludes that the PRC's "all-out support and assistance" will continue no matter what "difficulties and hazards" the Indochinese people may face or what "frantic military adventures the U.S. aggressors may embark on."

The Chinese speaker at the 20 December rally, Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan, noted that the Chinese are "taking concrete actions" to respond to the 13 December PRC Party-Government statement and to "render all-out support and assistance" to the Vietnamese and Indochinese people. Speaking at the 19 December banquet for the NFLSV delegation, PRC Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, in addition to pledging assistance for the Vietnamese, used language much like the 13 December PRC Party-Government statement in claiming that "U.S. imperialists wanton provocations against the Vietnamese people and other peoples of Indochina are also provocations against the Chinese people and the people of the whole world." Lin Piao, in his message on the VPA anniversary, similarly maintained that any U.S. "military adventure and war blackmail" against Vietnam or Indochina are also a "challenge" to the Chinese and other people.

Chinese comment on the NFLSV anniversary does not echo the party-government statement's endorsement of the NFLSV/PRG

CONFIDENTIAL



- 11 -

ten- and eight-point peace plans, but Dang Tran Thi, in his speeches at the banquet and rally, recalled this endorsement in listing examples of PRC support. Peking media on the 20th also publicized a Japanese Socialist Party statement which supported the NFLSV peace plans.

Dang Tran Thi, in both his rally and banquet speeches, predictably thanked the Chinese for their backing, declaring in the latter speech that the Vietnamese have "continuously received unparalleled, precious, all-round, effective, and timely support and assistance from China." He also acknowledged the assistance of other "fraternal socialist countries" and, in line with intensified attention to North-South solidarity in connection with the DRV appeal, he said that South Vietnamese "victories" in the past decade are "inseparable from the wholehearted assistance" of the DRV.

#### MOSCOW OBSERVES NFLSV ANNIVERSARY IN STANDARD FASHION

Moscow marks the 10th anniversary of the NFLSV in generally standard fashion, although an additional feature this year is the presence of a Front delegation led by Central Committee member Nguyen Van Hieu to take part in the festivities. For at least the past five years the Front is not known to have sent such a delegation to Moscow especially for the anniversary. Moscow's publicity is highlighted by the customary greetings message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, the usual "solidarity week" is held in connection with the anniversary, and there is again a Moscow public meeting as well as editorial comment in the press. The TASS report of the Moscow meeting does not indicate that any high-level Soviet official was present, the speaker being the chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee.\* Politburo member Shelepin did, however, attend the PRG Ambassador's reception this year as usual.

The Soviet leaders' message, carried by TASS on the 19th, is addressed, like Peking's, to both Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat. The message routinely expresses "sympathy and support" for the South Vietnamese patriots' struggle and

---

\* Since at least 1965 a CPSU Politburo member attended the meeting, except for last year when lower-ranking Party Secretary Katushev appeared. The lower-level attention may be because the main Front anniversary was shifted last year to the 6 June anniversary of the founding of the PRG.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 12 -

approval of the NFLSV/PRG "realistic program for a just political settlement." It repeats that the United States must immediately discontinue all acts of aggression and withdraw its forces "by a definite deadline." The message again says that the U.S. spread of the war to the whole of Indochina and the new "dangerous provocations" against the DRV show that the "so-called 'peace initiative'" announced by the United States is aimed at deceiving public opinion.

Addressing the PRG Ambassador's reception, according to a brief TASS summary on the 17th, Shelepin reiterated Soviet "support and assistance" for the South Vietnamese patriots. He denounced the U.S. Vietnamization policy as well as the "barbarous raids" on the DRV, and used the formulation in the Soviet Government statement that the USSR "will draw conclusions" from the new provocations. According to TASS' account he did not, however, specifically mention the Soviet statement. He expressed approval of the "new proposals on a cease-fire".... which the PRG put forth at the 94th (10 December) Paris.... session, but he apparently did not mention the NFLSV/PRG peace plan.

Editorials in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, in addition to usual praise of the NFLSV's accomplishments, also score the U.S. Vietnamization policy and the raids on the DRV. Both do recall that the USSR supported the DRV Party-Government appeal with a government statement. They repeat that by the bombing the United States violated its own commitments and its own declarations about desiring a peace settlement, IZVESTIYA specifically mentioning in this connection President Nixon's 7 October statement. IZVESTIYA also specifically expresses support for the NFLSV-PRG proposals of 8 May 1969 and 17 September 1970.

#### CAMBODIAN FRONT AGAIN DENOUNCES "FALSE" FUNK RADIO APPEAL

On 17 December NCNA in Chinese and English carries a statement by the FUNK Information Office, released at a press conference that day, exposing an alleged CIA "concoction" of "a so-called 'appeal' to the Central Committee of the FUNK," broadcast over the "forged" FUNK Radio. The statement does not indicate the content of the "appeal" but says that it was designed to "undermine the militant solidarity" of the Cambodian and Vietnamese people and "slander" the policy of resisting U.S. aggression pursued by Sihanouk and the FUNK. The statement points out that the forged "appeal"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 13 -

was broadcast "three days after U.S. imperialism once again adopted a hostile behavior toward the DRV." It does not, however, take the occasion to point out that the 10 December DRV Party-Government appeal issued in connection with the U.S. bombing was supported by a 15 December joint FUNK/RGNU statement.

The statement thus far has inexplicably been ignored by Hanoi media and FUNK radio, both of which, as well as NCNA, had carried Sihanouk and RGNU statements refuting broadcasts over the "false" radio last September.\*

#### SINO-CAMBODIAN FRIENDSHIP ANNIVERSARIES MARKED IN PEKING

Current PRC publicity for Cambodia includes a 17 December Peking reception addressed by Chou En-lai and Sihanouk marking the 10th anniversaries of the signing of the Sino-Cambodian treaty of friendship and nonaggression and the founding of the China-Cambodia Friendship Association. Chou expresses the conviction that the traditional friendship and unity between the two peoples will further develop "on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and in the struggle against the common enemy, U.S. imperialism," and he pledges "firm support" of the Cambodian people's struggle. Thanking the Chinese for their aid and support, Sihanouk alludes to the USSR's failure to recognize his government. He says that during independence, from 1955 to 1969, the Khmers thought that they had many friends, but they now have "painfully realized that the actual number of their real friends is limited." Peking also stresses the "unity" of the two peoples in an 18 December PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the anniversaries.

---

\* See the FBIS TRENDS of 10 September, pages 3-4, and 16 September, pages 7-8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 14 -

## POLAND

### GIEREK PROMISES CONCILIATION, CALLS FOR LAW AND ORDER

New PZPR First Secretary Edward Gierek projected a composite image of liberal understanding of public grievances, concern for "law and order," and orthodox loyalty to the Soviet Union in his first public statement as party leader, delivered during the waning phase of the northern seacoast riots which in just six days had toppled Wladyslaw Gomułka and four other old-line communists from the Politburo.

In his brief, 15-minute speech on radio and TV on the 20th, the day of his election, Gierek declared at the outset that the riots in Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and Elblag had "shocked" the country and confronted it with "a great danger." But unlike Premier Cyrankiewicz, who had addressed the nation on the 17th, Gierek put primary blame on economic conditions which he traced almost in so many words to the bungling of his predecessor and only secondary blame on the workers and their "exploiters." While there are "real"--that is, unavoidable--difficulties, he said, there are "also causes which resulted from badly thought-out conceptions in economic policy," causes which "we shall endeavor to remove."

Spelling out an "iron rule" henceforth of dealing only with "reality," he promised "to consult broadly with the working class and intelligentsia, to respect the principle of collective decision-making and democracy." While promising no rollback in prices, Gierek noted the 20 December PZPR plenum's decision to "examine" the plight of low-income families "most badly affected" by the rise in food prices.

At the same time, the new party leader declared that "no hostile forces" could divert Poland from "the road of socialism," on which it had embarked in 1945 after "the most tragic experiences in our history." In this connection he said "we are marching together with the entire great socialist community, above all with our tried friend and ally, the Soviet Union," which is "the basic guarantee" of Poland's "independence, security, and development." In passing, as part of his assurance of continuity in foreign policy, he noted that in the interests of European security, Poland "had entered together with other socialist countries the road of normalization of relations" with West Germany.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 15 -

While stressing that "the overwhelming majority of Poland" and its workers had shown discipline in the crisis, Gierek said that other workers--though with "most frequently honest" motives--had "permitted their emotions to carry them away and stopped work," an action which was "exploited by enemies of socialism, by asocial and criminal elements." It was not the worker protest, he assured his listeners, but the actions of the latter elements that "had to be met" by the militia and troops. Twice in his concluding passages he called "law and order" essential to normal life in the country, appealing at the same time to the youth to correctly channel its "ardor and youthful energy."

In a representative commentary on the speech, TRYBUNA LUDU's editorial on the 23d views Gierek's assertion of the principle of collective decision-making and democracy as based "on full respect for the civil rights of both discussion and criticism as well as on the honest duty to do honest work and show disciplined action."

PERSONNEL      An hour and a half after the Politburo changes had  
CHANGES      been announced by PAP at 1830 GMT on the 20th,  
                the Warsaw radio reported that the reason for  
Gomulka's resignation was "grave illness." An hour after that,  
the same radio explained that he had been ill with a "circulatory"  
disorder "for some weeks now" and that symptoms had become more  
acute on the morning of the 19th. His current hospital treatment,  
it said, would "require a long period of time."

Dropped from the Politburo with Gomulka are Boleslaw Jaszczuk, who had delivered the main address at the 14 December PZPR plenum which announced the price changes and triggered the disorders, leading ideologist Zenon Kliszko, Ryszard Strzelecki, and Marian Spychalski, who subsequently also lost his position as the country's president at the 23 December session of the Sejm. Reporting the Sejm session, a Warsaw broadcast that day also said Cyrankiewicz was named as the new president and was replaced as premier by Piotr Jaroszewicz.

Notable among the new members of the Politburo are two elevated from candidate status, Polish CEMA representative Piotr Jaroszewicz and Mieczyslaw Moczar, chairman of the militant partisan organization ZBOWiD and former Minister of Internal Affairs. The elevation of the hardlining Moczar to full Politburo membership apparently reflects the compromise aspect of the election of Gierek as First Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 16 -

STATUS OF                      Warsaw and regional radios are currently at  
DISTURBANCES                  pains to convey an impression of a return to  
                                normal in the northern coastal cities and are  
                                carrying no reports of further disturbances. The Warsaw  
                                domestic service on the 21st, stressing that "intensive and  
                                honest work at all levels is today the most important task  
                                for us all," cited the Gdansk radio for the report that "more  
                                than 30 percent" of workers at the Gdansk and Gdynia shipyards  
                                had reported for work that morning. A brief item on the Gdansk  
                                radio later on the 21st said that the shipyard had "started  
                                normal work" and that workers who had "not yet received a call  
                                to work and new passes should come to the cadres department  
                                tomorrow morning to settle the formalities."

The situation appeared to be less settled at Szczecin. The Szczecin radio on the 21st carried a communique on apparently inconclusive talks held by party, state, and union representatives with shipyard worker representatives. It said the Szczecin authorities had passed on to the central authorities in Warsaw "all these matters"--the problems of wages and prices, reasons for the riots, and so forth--"the settlement of which was not within their terms of reference." Also on the 21st, the Szczecin radio carried a reminder on the curfew in that city, stating and "repeating" that "it is forbidden to be out in the streets of Szczecin between 1800 and 0600 hours." About an hour later the radio informed militia authorities that the curfew does not apply to shipyard workers returning home from work. This item was repeated 10 times in 20 minutes.

On the 22d the Szczecin radio claimed that the dockworkers there "today decided, on their own initiative, to resume ship handling work" and that about 400 men had reported for work, thus enabling Szczecin port to "enter the rhythm of normal work, so much needed by Poland." About an hour later the radio said defensively that Szczecin inhabitants could see for themselves that the city's transport system was functioning normally.

Further underscoring the picture of restored normal conditions, the Warsaw domestic service on the 22d reported that the Council of Ministers had cancelled its hardline decision of the 17th on bringing the situation under control by force. Some four hours later, the Warsaw radio reported that the curfew in the Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot, and Elblag area would be lifted as of the 23d.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 17 -

## MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO POLISH DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow's concern over the Polish disturbances and their possible impact on the Soviet people is reflected in its extremely cautious treatment of developments, based largely on the Polish party's own interpretations. Brezhnev's message of congratulations to Gierek, broadcast by Radio Moscow at 1400 GMT on the 21st, represents the first authoritative Soviet comment on the riots in Poland and the ensuing change of power. Putting Moscow's stamp of approval on the new regime, the message hails the new PZPR First Secretary as "a sincere friend of the Soviet Union, a convinced communist and internationalist." It also expresses confidence that the Polish party "will be able to successfully overcome the difficulties which recently occurred in the country's life"--an apparent assurance that at this juncture the Soviets believe the PZPR can handle the situation without "fraternal aid." The reference to the recent "difficulties" could be read as encompassing an implied criticism of the Gomulka regime.

Earlier on the same day, TASS had summarized Gierek's radio and TV address, quoting him to the effect that recent events had "painfully recalled to mind the known truth that the party must maintain permanent ties with the people" and citing his promise to examine the possibilities of raising workers' wages and to study the workers' problems. It also predictably singled out his comment that Poland will strengthen its friendship with the Soviet Union.

Radio Moscow had first informed home listeners of the shakeup in the Polish leadership at 0900 GMT on the 21st--more than five hours after Polish central media first reported it. TASS' international service, however, picked up the Warsaw PAP announcement of the leadership shift little more than an hour after it was issued. The Radio Moscow account reported, without comment, that the PZPR had accepted Gomulka's "resignation" in connection with his "severe illness" and that Gierek was elected to replace him. It also reported that the party plenum had "instructed the Politburo to consider in the next few days measures to improve the material position of low-paid and large families whose budgets have suffered most from recent price changes." The radio did not link the leadership changes to the Polish riots.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 18 -

Moscow had first acknowledged the Gdansk outbreak to domestic listeners at 1900 GMT on the 16th--four hours after Warsaw media first reported it. TASS on the 18th carried the text of the Polish Council of Ministers decree on the disturbances, as well as the text of a TRYBUNA LUDU editorial on the same day describing the situation in Gdansk and appealing for "reason" and a sense of responsibility. PRAVDA printed the Polish editorial on the 19th. At the same time, Moscow has sought to play down the effects of the Polish disturbances in comment emphasizing a business-as-usual theme and describing Polish economic progress. TASS on the 19th, under the heading "Industrial Progress in Poland," said that reports about "labor achievements are coming in from all over Poland" and that factory workers "are fully resolved to fulfill quotas for the current year ahead of schedule." On the same day TASS reported that "despite the difficult situation which has arisen as a result of recent events and thanks to the efforts of primary workers, the shipyards of Gdansk and Gdynia have delivered several new ships to domestic and foreign customers."

**BROADCASTS TO POLAND** As in its other broadcasts, Radio Moscow's Polish-language service has hewed closely to the Polish party's own approach. A typical broadcast to Poland on the 20th quoted from the PAP communique on the situation in Gdansk, stressing the seriousness of the events and calling for "vigilance" on the part of the workers. The radio also quoted a ZYCIE WARSZAWY article to the effect that the Gdansk events "require every Pole who feels duty bound and responsible for his country and for Poland's prestige, socialist sovereignty, and fate to resist any attempt to endanger these great values."

#### EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES CIRCUMSPECT, ASSAIL RFE AND VOA

Following the Soviet example and reflecting their own concerns over the possible impact of the Polish events, Moscow's East European allies also reacted with circumspection. Bulgaria and Romania publicized accounts of healthy economic situations in their own countries.

The media briefly reported the Gdansk disorders and picked up Warsaw's announcement of the Polish leadership changes without substantial comment. Kadar, Zhivkov, Ceausescu, and Husak all sent brief messages of congratulations to Gierek. Bulgarian

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 19 -

and East German commentaries assailed the allegedly incendiary role played by Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America--a theme played once in available Soviet comment, in a Bonn-dated Radio Moscow report on the 22d which noted "the substantial expansion of inflammatory programs by the Voice of America and the infamous RFE" in broadcasts to Poland and other East European countries.

**BULGARIA** Sofia seemed to betray particular concern over possible contagion of the Polish disorders. The party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 20 December devoted an entire page to a meeting held in the paper's editorial office "with responsible economic leaders of industry and domestic trade" for talks on trends and measures aimed at improving the quality and increasing the quantity of consumer goods in Bulgaria. Various articles and statements emphasized that there are no food shortages in Bulgaria, that minor shortages occur only in industrially produced consumer goods, and that primary attention should now be concentrated on improving the quality and distribution of consumer goods.

The only monitored original Bulgarian comment on the Polish disturbances came in a Radio Sofia item on the 19th which assailed Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America for "instigating and calling for violence and irresponsible actions in their broadcasts to Poland."

**EAST GERMANY** Against the background of the recent conclusion of the Polish-West German treaty, East German comment on the Polish disturbances centered on alleged attempts by Western radio stations operating in Bonn, with the tacit approval of the Bonn Government, to exacerbate tensions in Poland via Polish-language broadcasts.

An ADN commentary on the 18th charged that "the monopoly press as well as radio and TV stations in the FRG and in West Berlin have taken the excesses by criminal and rowdy elements in Gdansk as an occasion for a directed inflammatory campaign against the socialist order in Poland." On the same day the agency also attacked RFE's "subversive" broadcasting station for "adding fuel to the fire" in Poland. ADN added that the station "only recently" had its license extended by the Bonn Government and quoted a spokesman for the government as stating "that there is no intention of changing anything in the present arrangement." East Berlin Radio on the 19th picked up a Paris AFP report that the Voice of America had tripled its transmissions to Poland and other East European countries since the outbreak of the Polish unrest.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 20 -

CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
AND HUNGARY

Prague and Budapest both hewed closely to the Soviet treatment of the Polish events, relying on Polish sources for interpretations of the disorders. The media of both countries reported the Gdansk outbreak briefly and without comment and took note of the subsequent leadership changes. A dispatch from MTI's correspondent in Warsaw observed on the 22d that to judge by "conversations with the people" and "the spontaneous workers' meetings" taking place throughout Poland, it was evident that the people are united around Gierek and his party. No dispatches from the correspondent were monitored from MTI while the disorders were in progress.

## ROMANIA

Bucharest reports on the Polish disturbances were extremely scanty. The party daily SCINTEIA first reported the outbreaks on the 17th, closely following the PAP version and noting that the "measures taken by authorities led to the crushing of the adventurist elements and the establishment of order in the city." An identical report was published in other Bucharest dailies on the same day, and no other reports of the disorders were carried in issues available through the 18th.

According to AGERPRES on the 20th, the Romanian press "amply featured the practical measures that are being applied in Romania in the domain of improving organization, planning and management of agriculture, as well as the achievements registered in all branches of the national economy."

## TIRANA AIRS STATEMENT OF PURPORTED DISSIDENT POLISH CP

Moving to exploit the Polish disorders, Radio Tirana broadcast to Polish listeners early on 20 December a statement attributed to an alleged dissident "Polish Communist Party," purportedly operating in Poland, which called for the overthrow of the Gomulka regime.\*

---

\* Since the spring of 1967, Tirana has provided propaganda support for various dissident organizations allegedly challenging ruling parties in Soviet bloc countries. It has aired considerable propaganda in behalf of an alleged "Polish Communist Party" led by one Kazimierz Mijal, purporting to conduct clandestine operations in Poland. Gomulka attacked such Albanian "disruptive" efforts in an address at the Fifth PZPR Congress in November 1968, and Radio Moscow on occasion has ridiculed Mijal as "the sole member of the so-called Polish Communist Party."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 21 -

The statement depicted the unrest as the first step in "a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the Gomulka dictatorship" and denounced the regime for spilling the blood of Polish workers in Gdansk. Telling Polish listeners that "the Polish Communist Party" is "your revolutionary party," the statement urged workers to "organize revolutionary committees of unity in every plant, enterprise, and institution for the struggle to overthrow the Gomulka dictatorship." The statement was signed: "Polish Communist Party, Warsaw."

In its own name, Tirana mounted more cautious efforts to fan the Polish unrest. A report broadcast in Radio Tirana's Polish service on the 17th and 18th, after denouncing the use of "fascist terror" against the demonstrators, commented that "there is no doubt that this kind of step will only intensify the hatred and legitimate revolt of the Polish people." The radio followed up this comment with the playing of Chopin's revolutionary etude.

On the 19th, an article in the party daily ZERI I POPULLIT attributed the "revolt" in Poland to worker dissatisfaction with the Gomulka's regime's "traitorous course of restoring capitalism" in every aspect of Polish life. It went on to express confidence that the Polish people would not bow to fascist violence," but it made no direct appeal for deposition of the Gomulka regime.

On the 21st, reporting the preceding day's PAP announcement of the Polish leadership shakeup, Radio Tirana described the change as "a new cunning maneuver replacing the compromised revisionist Gomulka by revisionist Gierek." The "maneuver," it said, is designed to gain time and mislead the workers.

#### PEKING SEES CRISIS IN SOVIET "COLONIAL RULE" IN EAST EUROPE

Peking has seized upon the demonstrations in Poland and the ouster of Gomulka to press its line against Soviet dominance in East Europe and to advertise Chinese support for anti-Soviet sentiment in that area. A 22 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article and a companion NCNA report on the 21st--Peking's standard form of authoritative comment on a current development--warmly applauded the Polish demonstrations and interpreted Gomulka's fall as a sign that "the colonial rule of Soviet revisionist social imperialism in East Europe has fallen into a crisis." NCNA on the 22d also carried the 19 December ZERI I POPULLIT article discussing the Polish people's grievances against their "revisionist" leadership.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 22 -

Peking's reaction, post-dating the change of leadership in Warsaw on 20 December, indicates that the PRC does not view the new leadership any more favorably than it did Gomulka's. Thus the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator observed with distaste that Gierek, the newly appointed First Secretary of "the Polish revisionist party," expressed an intention to cooperate with Moscow and made "some empty promises" to calm the situation. At the same time, Commentator added, Gierek warned that the leadership would not allow chaos to take over, thus "laying the ground for the slaughter of workers." Commentator concluded that Gomulka's ouster does not mean the end of the antirevisionist struggle. Similarly, the NCNA report, noting that Gomulka has stepped down but "the contradictions have not in any way been resolved," pointed out that events "are still developing."

Both Commentator and the NCNA report referred to Soviet troop movements connected with the Polish troubles. "Had the Soviet revisionist clique" ordered direct intervention, according to Commentator, "it would only expose its social imperialist features still more clearly and accelerate the rise in a more violent form of the struggle against Soviet revisionism by the people of Poland and East Europe." In another passage relating the Polish events to a broader East European context, Commentator described Poland under "the Gomulka revisionist clique, like Czechoslovakia and certain other East European countries," as "a powder-keg which might go off at any time."

The sharp anti-Soviet thrust of Peking's reaction to the Polish developments makes clear the motivation behind the latest Chinese breach of polemical restraint vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. The most recent previous instance in which Peking put aside its polemical restraint to comment on Soviet-East European relations was in mid-September when the Chinese belatedly reacted (with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, a companion NCNA report, and a reprint of an Albanian article) to the Soviet-FRG treaty signed a month earlier. Peking called the treaty a betrayal of the GDR's sovereignty and took the opportunity to recall the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Both East Germany and Czechoslovakia have figured in harsh Chinese attacks on Moscow's practice of "social imperialism" in East Europe. Unlike its denunciations of the Czechoslovak and Polish leaders for knuckling under to Moscow, however, Peking's comment on the GDR has avoided censuring the Ulbricht regime.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 23 -

In line with its efforts to restore normal state relations with the Soviet bloc countries, Peking sent an ambassador to Warsaw in August. That fundamental ideological and political differences have persisted is indicated by Peking's reaction to the Polish disturbances and its publicity on PRC National Day for a message from the splinter "Communist Party of Poland" along with a message from the Polish Government. The former message, addressed to the Mac-Lin-Chou trinity, referred to a struggle against the Polish communist "renegades" who have betrayed the country and become "faithful flunkies of the Soviet social imperialism." Peking did not, however, pick up the statement purporting to come from the Albania-based "Polish Communist Party" calling for Gomulka's overthrow, broadcast by Radio Tirana in Polish on 20 December before the leadership change was announced.

Peking's quick, hostile reaction to Gierek's accession to power suggests an effort to play on anti-Soviet sentiment while acknowledging that the new leadership is too dependent on Moscow to provide Peking with the leverage it has sought among the Balkan mavericks. In contrast, Peking's care in avoiding directly hostile comment on the East German leadership suggests a hope to revive the Khrushchev-era flirtation between Peking and Pankow based on hardline opposition to Central European detente.

#### BELGRADE SEES CHANCE FOR "SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY" UNDER GIEREK

Major Yugoslav newspapers and radio stations, with their own correspondents in Warsaw, have carried daily reportage and comment on the Polish developments, presenting the Polish official line as well as their own interpretations. Tito's message of congratulations to Gierek, carried by TANYUG on 22 December, extends "cordial congratulations and comradely greetings" and asserts a conviction that "the relations of friendly cooperation" between the Polish and Yugoslav parties and states will "continue to grow stronger in the interests of our people, peace, and socialism."

Freewheeling comment in Yugoslav media includes a commentary by Radio Belgrade's leading political commentator Kicevic on the 21st exploring the implications of the Polish events for the rest of the communist world. While granting that the recent events in Poland are "primarily an internal affair," Kicevic added: "They confirm that socialism cannot progress

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 24 -

without a constant strengthening . . . of real socialist democracy." In the final analysis, he said, a real socialist democracy means "liberation from dogmatism and stereotypes" and a quest for innovations. Judging by present indications, Kicevic concluded, the change in the Polish leadership "indicates such a course" and the new leaders should have the support of "all people who wish Poland well."

Skopje's NOVA MAKEDONIJA, according to TANJUG on the 22d, said that the changes in the PZPR leadership "only confirm that the recent events in Gdansk and other Baltic cities were not the work of hooligans and enemies of socialism, as was the intention to represent them at first." The events, the paper added, "reflected the profound disappointment existing, above all, over the poor economic situation and policy conducted for years by the party and government." Gomulka's departure, the paper concluded, "constitutes a logical result of the policy he pursued for years, the one usually termed 'a great illusion.'"

#### ITALIAN, SPANISH CP'S PUT BLAME ON LACK OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY

Comment critical of the Gomulka regime's policies, with overtones of censure of Soviet-style orthodoxy in general, comes from some of the same West European communist parties that had openly condemned the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Notably, the Italian and Spanish CP's have interpreted the rioting as confirmation of their long-held view that genuine "socialist democracy," entailing a permanent dialog between the workers and the party and state, is essential to a socialist state.

ITALIAN CP      The Italian party organ L'UNITA on 18 December frontpaged a party Politburo communique on the Polish events which expressed "emotion and pain" for the victims of the violence, then argued that both the causes and possible remedies for Poland's "difficult economic situation" must be discussed with the workers "in order to solicit their necessary contribution and commitment through a broad democratic participation." Observing that if this is lacking, opportunities are provided for "the activity of the forces of provocation and those hostile to socialism," the communique declared that problems of the socialist countries' development "can only be resolved through the complete affirmation of socialist democracy, a fundamental aspect of which--even in the different and specific conditions of each country--is a profound link between the party and the popular masses." It concluded by underscoring the Italian party's fealty to this principle.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 25 -

A more pointed critique of Polish developments appeared in another communique published in the same issue of L'UNITA, signed jointly by the secretariats of the communist-dominated Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) and the noncommunist Italian Trade Union Confederation (CISL). It expressed the trade unionists' view of the Polish events as testimony to "an insufficient development of direct democracy and of the autonomous function of the trade union." Conveying "deeply felt condolences" to Polish workers, the communique urged Italian workers "to discuss these grave events in their grassroots meetings and to manifest their solidarity with Polish workers."

A L'UNITA commentary picked up by Yugoslavia's TANYUG on the 20th criticized the relations between the Polish leadership and the workers and indicated that Poland was not the only country which faced this problem. The paper said it had been proven in 1956 that treating trade unions as "a transmission belt" is counterproductive and noted that this approach, abandoned long ago by the Italian party, still prevailed in Poland. While workers' councils formally exist in Poland, it added, they have a rather limited function. L'UNITA concluded that a lack of socialist democracy leads to dangerous explosions and protests. A message to Gierek from party Secretary General Luigi Longo, as reported on the 22d by AFP, expresses sadness over the Polish events and welcomes Gierek's pledge to work for conditions in which socialist democracy may develop and be respected.

**SPANISH CP** A persistently outspoken critic of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its continuing after-effects, the Spanish CP is the only West European communist party whose comment available to date links the Polish events with the Czechoslovak. In a 21 December commentary over its clandestine Radio Independent Spain, the party lectured that "bureaucratic forms, poor relations with the masses, and ignorance of their aspirations" can only bring "tragic situations for socialism"--the kind of thing that happened in Poland and that "happened before in Czechoslovakia." The broadcast connected Gomulka's departure from the leadership with his "failure to recognize the dissatisfaction growing in the hearts of millions of workers," which led to a confrontation between the people and armed forces "in which tanks attacked the workers." It drew from these events the lesson that the socialist system "must make the workers' participation in the country's leadership and in the solution of problems effective."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 26 -

Crediting Gierak with awareness of the root problems, Radio Independent Spain commented that the problems besetting Polish workers "could have been solved if they had been recognized and discussed in open and frank debate." It concluded that the Polish events "once again" demonstrated the need for a socialist state "to find a way to critically examine itself, to present alternatives in the use of men and methods on the basis of a broad political and social democracy."

**BRITISH CP** The British CP, while more cautious in drawing general ideological conclusions from the violence in Poland, was more specific in pointing out mistakes that led to the rioting. A frontpage editorial in the party organ MORNING STAR on the 18th questioned whether it was necessary to raise prices immediately while deferring wage increases and expressed doubt about the wisdom of timing the price increases "for the immediate pre-Christmas period." Saying "many will conclude that errors were made," the editorial added that it would be well for the mistakes to be "frankly admitted," since candor strengthens "the ties between government and people . . . as experience in Poland has shown in the past." The paper granted that it was necessary to deal with "criminals and looters" but argued that it was equally important "to examine legitimate grievances of the workers and do everything possible to rectify them."

**FRENCH CP** A cautious statement of disapproval came from the French Communist Party (PCF), which had initially opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia but subsequently accepted the line on the "normalization" process in Prague and muted its dissent. Spelling out the party's position in the party organ L'HUMANITE in a frontpage article on 19 December, the paper's editor and party Politburo member Etienne Fajon accepted Gierak's line that some "honest workers" had been "induced" to participate in the Polish demonstrations and said this showed that "real political and social difficulties exist." Stating that the difficulties may be partially traceable to "factors" deriving from the pre-socialist past, Fajon said it would be difficult to deny the existence of errors or shortcomings in economic management, in party and state relations with the people, and "in the functioning of socialist democracy." He carefully disclaimed any intention "to judge or to criticize the policy, actions, and methods of another communist party"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 27 -

but remarked that the PCF could not fail to state its views "on a tragedy whose repercussions transcend the Polish borders." He expressed the hope that Poland's difficulties will be surmounted through "the joint efforts" of the working class and its party.

Evidently concerned lest the news of the Polish bloodshed rub off on the PCF's image in France and affect PCF efforts to build an electoral alliance with noncommunist parties, Fajon concluded his article by stressing that "the PCF has no intention of copying Poland's experiment here" and hopes to move toward socialism through "a clearly established understanding among parties and organizations supporting socialism" while taking due account of "national conditions."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 28 -

## BERLIN

## GDR, USSR DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SPD MEETING "CONSEQUENCES"

Without directly mentioning the 19-22 December traffic slowdown between the FRG and West Berlin, Soviet and GDR official statements and accompanying propaganda disclaim responsibility for the "consequences" of the "illegal" meeting of SPD landtag leaders in West Berlin on 21 December.\*

Three days before the slowdown began, ADN reported that a GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman had "sharply protested" the proposed meeting as a "gross violation" by the FRG of West Berlin's status as an "independent political entity." The spokesman went on to repeat the standard argument that even the Western Big Three have "repeatedly confirmed" that West Berlin has never been a land of the FRG and "must not be governed by it." The ADN report said the spokesman noted that the SPD move had "created difficulties for the successful course of the four-power talks" and that "such presumptuous acts" regarding West Berlin worked against détente in Europe and "would block steps to normalize relations between West Berlin and the GDR." A longer ADN report of the spokesman's statement published in the 17 December NEUES DEUTSCHLAND adds that the SPD meeting was aimed "directly against the interests of the West Berlin population."

On 19 December the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin made a "representation" to the Western Big Three in West Berlin regarding the SPD meeting. According to TASS on the 21st, the representation pointed out the "provocative nature" of this action, whose only purpose was to reassert the FRG's "illegal claims" to West Berlin, cause international "complications," and "create additional difficulties in the way of normalizing the situation" in and around West Berlin. Referring obliquely to the traffic slowdown, which had started on the 19th, it went on to say that "the organizers and sponsors of these illegal actions bear the responsibility for all possible consequences" and concluded that the Soviet Union and its allies "cannot remain indifferent when their lawful interests are

---

\* See the TRENDS of 2 December, pages 20-21, and 16 December, pages 16-17, for background on GDR and Soviet reaction to the four-day traffic slowdown between West Berlin and the FRG that started on 28 November, when the CDU/CSU parliamentary faction met in West Berlin 30 November-1 December.

- 29 -

being infringed." Moscow media have not been heard to mention the Western Big Three response to the Soviet representation in which they expressed concern and surprise that the USSR would permit harassments which could jeopardize the prospects for progress on the West Berlin question.

Echoing the Soviet Embassy's representation, a 19 December Moscow radio commentary in German by Zakharov said it is "illusory" for the West to hope that the originators of such "provocatory acts in West Berlin will succeed in passing the responsibility for their acts in West Berlin to others." Impugning the FRG's motives in permitting the SPD meeting to take place and labeling it another "link in the chain of provocations in West Berlin," Zakharov said one "must realize" that not only the ratification of the Soviet-FRG treaty but also a "constructive approach by the FRG Government to the independent political entity of West Berlin would contribute to a rapid and positive conclusion" of the quadripartite talks.

In a similar vein, a TASS commentary by Kornilov on the 21st asserted that sponsors of the SPD gathering in West Berlin and their "protectors" should bear in mind "that they will have to shoulder all the responsibility for possible consequences of such an illegal act." This charge was repeated on the 20th in an ADN commentary which observed that one cannot "remain indifferent" to such an "intentional disturbance." It stressed that the SPD meeting was a "deliberate blow" to the interests of the West Berlin population at a time when SPD leaders have advocated steps to accommodate the "human interests" of the West Berliners.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 30 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

### BORDER RIVER NAVIGATION TALKS CONCLUDE WITH PROTOCOL

A TASS dispatch from Blagoveshchenk on 19 December reported the conclusion of the 16th annual session of the joint commission on border river navigation. The session, held across the border in Heiho beginning on 10 July, ended with the signing of a protocol and agreement to hold the next session in the USSR. TASS gave no other details. Peking on the 23d bluntly reported that the session "did not reach agreement on the problems discussed."

While duly reported in the Soviet press on 20 December, the TASS report adds little to the picture Moscow has sought to present of a restoration of normal Sino-Soviet state relations. Moscow's announcement on last year's session, which lasted only from 18 June to 8 August, said the protocol signed then recorded agreement by the two sides to undertake "certain measures to improve the shipping situation" on the border waterways. Peking's announcement at that time said the Chinese delegation, "displaying the attitude of making the conference a success and seeking solutions to the problems," signed a protocol on "some of the concrete questions" regarding shipping on the waterways. In view of the complications from the territorial issues hanging over these meetings, the two sides appear to have proceeded warily in dealing with the border river questions.

### IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTE PERSISTS IN POLEMICAL COMMENT

The Polish disturbances have given the Chinese another opportunity to breach their polemical restraint toward the Soviets in order to attack Moscow's positions in East Europe.\* Moscow promptly replied in broadcasts to China complaining that Peking has again, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, sided with "antisocialist" elements and shown its hostility to "the socialist community." Betraying sensitivity to Peking's charges, a Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 22d sought to defend relations within the Soviet bloc and publicized remarks by Gierek upon his elevation to party chief in Poland. Another Mandarin

---

\* See the Poland section of this TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 31 -

broadcast on the 22d similarly stressed the role of the socialist community, which it described as "a closely united and powerful force" which is playing a growing role in world developments.

Earlier, a Mandarin broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress on 15 December pointed to Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda as a negative factor inhibiting the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. The broadcast said the Soviet people were glad "some progress" had recently been realized in restoring normal relations, citing the trade agreement and the exchange of ambassadors. Soviet comment broadcast to the Chinese occasionally refers to progress of this sort, but there have been no Soviet elite references to the recent developments.

Apart from an article in AGITATOR on 20 October asserting that the CPSU "is still pursuing" a long-term policy aimed at cooperation with the Chinese, Moscow has offered little hope that an ideological accommodation can be reached. The AGITATOR article was devoted to the 10th anniversary of the 1960 Moscow international communist conference, which might serve as a symbol of the possibility of compromise within the communist movement. However, Moscow has given the anniversary only low-level treatment; neither the party's daily, PRAVDA, nor its main theoretical journal, KOMMUNIST, has carried comment marking the occasion. In contrast, the first anniversary of the 1969 conference--at which Moscow launched a bandwagon anti-Chinese campaign--was marked by an authoritative PRAVDA editorial article which insisted that there can be no concessions in the ideological conflict with Peking.

The most authoritative comment on the anniversary of the 1960 conference has been an article in the biweekly central committee journal PARTY LIFE (No. 23, signed to press 24 November) by V. Zagladin--identified recently in QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY as head of the chair of the communist, workers, and national liberation movement of the Institute of Social Sciences under the party central committee. A main burden of the article is to demonstrate the necessity for a "general line" of the international communist movement even during a period when there is no central organization of the movement. It claims that a cooperative approach to formulating a general line was followed at the 1957, 1960, and 1969 conferences--though in fact the 1969 conference carefully avoided raising the question of a general line. In discussing the importance of achieving a common political platform

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 32 -

at the 1960 conference, the article recounts the Sino-Soviet dispute at that time over such issues as "nationalism and... petit bourgeois adventurism," the role of world socialism, and leadership of the third world.

The Zagladin article says the 1969 conference confirmed the validity of "the main ideas" of the 1960 meeting, but it notably fails to recall the anti-Chinese dimension of last year's conference. This might be construed as an effort to leave open the possibility of a compromise with the Chinese in the manner of the 1960 conference, but it seems more probably to reflect Moscow's current practice of playing down the Sino-Soviet dispute in its more visible propaganda. Characteristically, Soviet comment marking the anniversary of the 1960 conference in broadcasts to the Chinese invoked the 1969 conference as a forum at which the Chinese were strongly denounced.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 33 -

## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## KWANGTUNG CLAIMS SUCCESS IN REBUILDING PARTY AT LOWER LEVEL

Kwangtung Province has made the same sweeping claim of progress in party rebuilding that Hunan made earlier this month, 10 days before it announced formation of the first new provincial party committee in the nation. Echoing the wording of the Changsha radio's 4 December report on party building in Hunan, the Canton radio said on 20 December that a "majority" of counties and municipalities in Kwangtung have set up new party committees. "New primary party organizations," the broadcast added, "have also been established in most units."

The unusually ebullient Canton broadcast declared that, with the setting up of the new party organizations, "advanced elements" who emerged during the cultural revolution have been "absorbed into the party" while "some dregs have been removed." The evil influence of both left and right has been overcome as local party members "actively implemented" party policies on dealing with the mass organizations and clearing away the influence of anarchism. The Canton broadcast concluded with laudatory reports on individual county party committees previously reported by Kwangtung media.

Peking propagandists have made no further mention of the Hunan party committee following the initial burst of nationwide publicity for the announcement of its formation. Changsha radio, on 16 December, broadcast a resolution adopted by the committee's first plenum; the resolution called routinely on party committees at all levels to study and apply Mao's thought, to achieve unity, and to remain close to the masses. The traditional New Year's editorial, due next week, will afford the center, if it chooses, a prime opportunity to portray the Hunan committee as an exemplary model for 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 34 -

## MIDDLE EAST

Moscow's propaganda in connection with the visit of a CPSU delegation led by Ponomarev to Cairo and that of a UAR party-government delegation led by 'Ali Sabri to Moscow is replete with assurances of continued Soviet support and "all-round assistance" for the Arabs' "just struggle to liberate their territories." And comment again presses themes prominent since Nasir's death, extolling Soviet-UAR friendship and cooperation, the UAR's adherence to Nasir's course, and Cairo's efforts to strengthen Arab unity.

Comment continues to present the UAR as seeking a political settlement; the communique on Ponomarev's visit expresses the CPSU's appreciation of the UAR's efforts for peace and for avoiding resumption of military operations, and propagandists favorably note Arab "restraint" in the face of Israeli provocations. The communique also provides Moscow's first formal support for the UAR's call for a "timetable" for Israeli withdrawal and implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. Both the communique and Kosygin in a luncheon speech honoring 'Ali Sabri's delegation urge implementation of Resolution 242; neither makes any mention of the Jarring talks or the cease-fire. Moscow continues to accuse Israel of procrastination aimed at sabotaging any peaceful initiatives, noting conflicting reports on Israel's attitude toward resumption of contacts through Jarring and claiming that Israel is "blackmailing" Washington to secure still more military, economic, and political concessions.

### CPSU-ASU COMMUNIQUE SUPPORTS PEACE EFFORTS, TIMETABLE PROPOSAL

Reportage on the 10-20 December visit to the UAR of a CPSU delegation led by Ponomarev highlights UAR-Soviet cooperation both in Egyptian domestic projects and in "anti-imperialist struggle," and TASS accounts of the CPSU-Arab Socialist Union (ASU) communique play up the USSR's "steady resolve" to give the UAR "all-round" support in its struggle against Israeli aggression. While the theme of Soviet support and assistance was stressed by Ponomarev in speeches during the visit, neither Cairo nor Moscow media apparently carried his remark, reported in the U.S. press, that the Soviet Union would support the UAR "under all circumstances."

CONFIDENTIAL

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 35 -

Presenting Cairo as seeking a peaceful, as opposed to military, settlement, the CPSU side expresses in the communique its "high assessment" of the UAR's "consistent efforts" for peace and "for preventing a resumption of the armed conflict in the Middle East." Arab "restraint and equanimity" in the face of alleged Israeli efforts to provoke the Arabs to "aggravate" the military situation were cited approvingly by Glukhov in the 4 December PRAVDA. And a widely broadcast foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on the 19th depicted the Arabs as "insisting that a Middle East settlement be reached by negotiation, by political means." Tsoppi hinted, however, that Arab patience was growing thin: He urged implementation of Resolution 242 in view of the fact that Israel "is slowly eroding the good will" of the Arabs by using the cease-fire period for "aggressive schemes" rather than trying to end the conflict.

The CPSU-ASU communique affirms both sides' "common stand" on means to solve the crisis, based on full implementation of Resolution 242. Both sides condemn Israel's policy of "procrastination and sabotage"--with "moral, material, and military aid from U.S. imperialist circles"--aimed at frustrating a settlement. The sides' prescription for a just peace calls for Israeli withdrawal, implementation of Resolution 242, respect for the "legal rights" of the Palestinian people, and fulfillment of UN decisions "on this question." The communique goes on--without specifically attributing the statement to either the CPSU or the ASU--to call for measures to secure these aims, including the "drawing up of a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from all occupied Arab territories and the implementation of other provisions" of Resolution 242. This constitutes Moscow's first formal endorsement of President as-Sadat's 30 November call for a "definite timetable for withdrawal" as the "one condition" for UAR agreement to another extension of the cease-fire. TASS on 1 December had reported him as saying the UAR would agree to an extension "only if an accurate calendar plan is set" for Israeli withdrawal; a later reference to UAR conditions for extension, in an Arabic-language broadcast on 9 December, referred merely to earlier Cairo statements that for agreement to be extended, Israel should "demonstrate its seriousness" toward the Jarring mission and express its desire to implement Resolution 242.

While as-Sadat had appeared to confine the timetable notion to withdrawal, a later Egyptian statement seemed to extend it

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 36 -

to all points of Resolution 242,\* and the communique reflects this broader application. This view is spelled out by a panelist on the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 20th: PRAVDA's Primakov cites the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH as quoting UAR official circles to the effect that in the event the Jarring mission is resumed, Cairo is prepared to submit a "serious document, including a calendar plan, for the withdrawal of Israeli troops, a plan coordinated with all the other clauses" of Resolution 242, including establishment of peace and assuring free passage for shipping.

**BACKGROUND** Moscow in 1968 had expressed formal support for a UAR proposal for staged implementation of the resolution. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement on 25 September that year declared that a UAR proposal for a "time schedule" for stage-by-stage implementation of Resolution 242 "merits every support" since it "opens possibilities for embarking without delay on the path of a political settlement." In his 4 October UN General Assembly address that year, Gromyko also expressed Soviet support for the UAR's "realistic proposal" and Moscow's readiness "to cooperate in implementing such a plan for restoring peace to an area that directly borders our southern frontiers and whose stability directly affects the Soviet Union's security." A PRAVDA editorial on 3 December 1968 assessed the suggestion as a "substantial measure" for contributing to a Middle East settlement.

#### 'ALI SABRI DELEGATION HEARS KOSYGIN CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL

Speaking at a 21 December luncheon for a visiting UAR party-government delegation headed by UAR Vice President 'Ali Sabri, Kosygin calls for a resolution of the crisis through "immediate" implementation of Resolution 242. According to a version of the speech broadcast in Arabic, he cites the resolution as demanding Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and recognition of the right of each state in the area to live in peace without being exposed to threats or use of force.

---

\* Cairo radio on 2 December reported a UAR official spokesman as declaring that the UAR had made it clear, when accepting an extension of the cease-fire as a result of the UNGA resolution, that it will not renew the cease-fire after this period under any circumstances unless there are "tangible and fruitful results" on implementing Resolution 242 through Jarring; it is understood, he added, that Jarring's mission "is confined to formulating a timetable for implementing" the resolution.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 37 -

Kosygin calls the Middle East one of the "dangerous breeding grounds of war danger" as a result of Israeli "aggression," and asserts that the Israeli "aggressors" and "those behind them" will not realize the aims of their expansionist policy. Rejecting the idea of peace at any price from Israel and its "imperialist patrons," Kosygin says the "Israeli extremists" must be under no illusion that through bargaining they will be able to get a price for their consent to a peaceful settlement.

Referring to the United States only in speaking of Israel's "backers," Kosygin makes no specific mention of U.S. military or economic assistance to Israel. As for Soviet aid to the Arabs, he says the USSR will continue to support the Arab people in their "just struggle," and observes that the current UAR-Soviet exchange of views affirms the unity of their stands on a large number of issues, as well as their efforts to develop and consolidate "vast cooperation in the political, economic, defense, and other fields."

AGENDA  
FOR TALKS            Moscow typically has offered no details on the talks other than short TASS reports of "statements for the press" on the sessions on the 21st and 22d. Reporting the first meeting, TASS said the sides held a broad exchange of opinions on questions of bilateral relations and certain topical questions of the present international situation, with "particular attention" to the Middle East situation. The talks were held in an atmosphere of friendship and "complete mutual understanding," TASS said, and both sides expressed "complete satisfaction" with the development of and readiness to expand friendly cooperation in all fields. In addition to Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin, the Soviet side included Ponomarev, Novikov, Gromyko, Grechko, Patolichev, and Skachkov.

Cairo radio reported on the 22d that Brezhnev and 'Ali Sabri had held an hour-long "closed meeting" that morning, and that the general session that day had formed subcommittees which began their work that evening. The sides to the economic subcommittee are led by Novikov and Deputy Premier 'Aziz Sidqi, the political subcommittee by Gromyko and Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad, and the military committee by Grechko and War Minister Fawzi. TASS noted only that Gromyko and Riyad met for a discussion of "questions related to the Middle East situation," held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere."

CONFIDENTIAL

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 38 -

Discussing the visit on the 20th, the day of the delegation's arrival, Cairo's AL-AHRAM said the delegation would stay seven to ten days, depending on the work of the subcommittees, the "period required for 'Ali Sabri to pay some visits connected with cooperation between the two sides," and the possibility of a meeting between 'Ali Sabri and members of the CPSU Politburo for a "general discussion." The paper noted that Sidqi was expected to concentrate chiefly on industrialization, including the war industries, and added that he would pay another visit later to the Soviet Union at the head of a big economic delegation.

A MENA correspondent's dispatch from Moscow to Cairo on the 20th said the political discussions would entail an exchange of views on the Security Council and the Middle East crisis; recent U.S. moves, including military and economic assistance to Israel; methods of implementing the 4 November UNGA resolution; Jarring's forthcoming report to U Thant, and the latter's report to the Security Council before 5 January; progress of the four-power talks in New York; and Arab-Soviet countermoves to "frustrate aggressive American-Israeli designs."

#### USSR COMPLAINS OF ISRAELI PROCRASTINATION ON JARRING TALKS

Moscow continues to accuse Israel of "procrastination and sabotage" of the Jarring mission and skeptically observes that even if the talks are resumed in January, there is no sign that Israel will renounce its obstructionist tactics with regard to a peaceful settlement. Dayan's 11 December talks in Washington were viewed by NOVOSTI observer Katin, in a 17 December domestic service commentary, as an effort to arrange long-term contracts for arms deliveries and to extract a number of political commitments. It would appear, he said, that this military-political program was approved in Washington with the "stylistic" addition of a paragraph recommending that Israel resume contacts with Jarring. He noted discussion in Israel "now and then" about the possibility of resuming talks with the Arab countries through Jarring "if the Arabs accept certain conditions" which amount to an "ultimatum." Katin concluded that Israel is in favor of the talks in theory but against them in practice.

A Matveyev article in IZVESTIYA on the 17th found the United States in the "unenviable position" of being blackmailed by Israel. Similarly, TASS commentator Orlov noted on the 21st that Israel had again shelved the matter of a decision on resuming contacts with Jarring, and at the same time was employing "crude black-

23 DECEMBER 1970

- 39 -

mail" aimed at compelling Washington to make still greater military, economic, and political concessions. In addition, he said, "efforts are being made to seriously influence American foreign policy in a spirit advantageous to the Tel Aviv extremists," one aim apparently being "to worsen relations to the utmost between the United States and the Soviet Union--the states which are called on to play an active role" in settling the conflict.

According to PRAVDA's Primakov, in the 20 December domestic service commentators' roundtable, the United States "obviously wants, in a purely formal way," to reactivate the Jarring talks because any indifference in this connection could affect the American position in the Arab world. One could say that the United States was really striving for a just peace, Primakov added, if Washington would abandon its patronage of the Israeli leaders and call a halt to the supply of offensive arms until Israel begins real talks about peace. Primakov expressed the belief that the United States is obviously capable of influencing "its partner" in this way.

UN MEDIATION IN  
CEASE-FIRE EXTENSION

Primakov also remarked that Israel is now bargaining for specific conditions from its allies in return for formally entering into contacts through Jarring. He complained that on the eve of making this decision, Israel was engaged in another tactic, that of "separating the question of extending the cease-fire period from the question of holding contacts through Jarring." Primakov here made what is apparently Moscow's first reference to Dayan's 16 December meeting in Jerusalem with Major General Siilasvuo, chief of the UN cease-fire observers, in a move to invoke the services of the UN mission to work out a new cease-fire agreement with Egypt. According to a 17 December Jerusalem POST report, the proposal to use the UN mission for the extension of the cease-fire was understood to be the result of Dayan's talks in Washington. Primakov, labeling the action a "perfidious move," conceded that at first glance "Israel's policy even looks attractive: It apparently is not interested in the resumption of military actions." He went on to note that Dayan "even" talked to the chief UN observer, offering "to come to an agreement or help the chief observer come to an agreement with the Egyptians on extending the cease-fire period." Primakov objected that such calls for a cease-fire extension are made under conditions of continuing Israeli occupation; Israel wants a peace which will not hinder its expansion, he said, and the UAR "naturally" rejects such an approach.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 40 -

## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

## USSR GIVES MINIMAL ATTENTION TO WIND-UP OF HELSINKI TALKS

Consistent with its low-keyed attention to the conclusion of the Vienna phase of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) last August, Soviet propaganda on the wind-up of the second Helsinki session is limited to reportage. TASS on 18 December transmitted the text of the communique issued by the U.S. and Soviet delegations earlier in the day. According to this document, the two sides continued their discussion "of a wide range of questions relating to the problems of limiting strategic offensive and defensive arms." The exchange of opinions "brought certain clarity to a number of aspects" of the questions discussed, and both delegations expressed their intention to resume talks in Vienna on 15 March.

Another TASS dispatch on the 18th reported remarks by the chiefs of the U.S. and Soviet delegations, Smith and Semenov, at a reception given by Finnish President Kekkonen. Semenov called the just concluded session "useful" and said the USSR believed the achievement of positive results "would be in keeping with the important interests of peace and international security." TASS said Ambassador Smith indicated that the U.S. delegation was looking forward to the next session in Vienna.

Meager Soviet comment on the Helsinki session, which began on 2 November, had balanced cautious optimism over the "businesslike atmosphere" with warnings about the possible effect of U.S. plans for moving forward with new weapons systems and an increased defense budget. The propaganda duly noted U.S. abstention--and the Soviet affirmative vote--on the UNGA resolution calling on nuclear nations to halt the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. A 2 December Moscow broadcast for North American listeners, discussing the 30 November Political Committee vote, concluded that Washington's position was the result of "the dominating pressure of the military-industrial complex."

COMMENT IN MANDARIN A commentary in Mandarin over Moscow's self-styled unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on 19 December seems clearly responsive to Chou En-lai's remarks on SALT in an interview with Edgar Snow published in the Italian weekly L'EPOCA on 13 December. The commentary assails Peking's attitude toward such disarmament measures as the partial test-ban treaty, the nonproliferation accord, and the UNGA resolution on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 41 -

banning the emplacement of mass-destruction weapons on the seabed. It rejects the contentions of "Chinese propaganda" that negotiations between the United States and USSR are aimed at maintaining a position of superiority and that the USSR "has not conducted any disarmament in the past 25 years." In the interview, which has not been publicized by Peking media, Chou had pressed both arguments in his criticism of SALT.

BACKGROUND ON PRC  
TREATMENT OF SALT

Chou's interview represents the first public comment on SALT by a high-level Chinese spokesman. Although unacknowledged in Peking's own media, his assessment is consistent with criticism which has appeared sporadically in Chinese propaganda over the years. In the only commentary devoted to the negotiations in PRC media--a heavily editorialized NCNA dispatch on 4 November 1969, subsequently broadcast by the Peking radio--the talks were characterized as another effort by the United States and the USSR, which are "contending and yet colluding with each other," to maintain nuclear superiority by placing restrictions on others and to develop their "nuclear military alliance."

Prior to the October 1969 announcement on the opening of the talks in Helsinki, NCNA dispatches had cited plans for curbing the strategic arms race as another example of U.S.-Soviet "global collaboration." In a similar vein, the Chinese press communique on the 27 December 1968 PRC hydrogen bomb test had said that U.S. "imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism" were "plotting to make a new deal of 'limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons systems,' in an effort to maintain their already broken nuclear monopoly and to push nuclear colonialism."

TOPIC IN BRIEF

VENTED U.S.  
NUCLEAR TEST

Moscow to date has given no special propaganda play to the vented U.S. underground nuclear test at the Nevada test site on 18 December.

TASS on the 19th, quoting U.S. Atomic Energy Commission sources, said that radioactive dust was discovered on the clothing of 300 workers and that 600 people were evacuated. On the 21st, a TASS dispatch reported that radiation from the test had been detected over Utah and that it could reach the territory of a neighboring country. Both the TASS dispatch and the domestic service on the 21st cited AP for the observation that in such a case the United

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 DECEMBER 1970

- 42 -

States would be violating the 1963 partial test-ban treaty. In reporting a similar incident two years ago, also played in a low key by Moscow, a PRAVDA dispatch had quoted the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as saying that contamination of the atmosphere by a test on 8 December 1968 was "in direct contravention" of the test-ban treaty.

CONFIDENTIAL